# EXHIBIT 33

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a Washington corporation,  Plaintiff,	) ) Civil Action No: 1:16-cv-993 (GBL/TCB)
V.  JOHN DOES 1-2 CONTROLLING A  COMPUTER NETWORK AND THEREBY	) ) )
INJURING PLAINTIFF AND ITS CUSTOMERS,	) ) )
Defendants.	) ) ) )

#### PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER

Plaintiff Microsoft Corp. ("Microsoft") has filed a complaint for injunctive and other relief pursuant to: (1) the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030); (2) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701); (3) the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a)(1), 1125(a), (c)); (4) the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)); and (5) the common law of trespass, unjust enrichment and conversion. Microsoft moved *ex parte* for an emergency temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (the Lanham Act), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (the All-Writs Act). On August 5, 2016, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and order to show cause why an injunction should not issue. Defendants have not responded to the Court's order to show cause.

## FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Having reviewed the papers, declarations, exhibits, memorandum, and all other pleadings and papers relevant to Microsoft's request for a Preliminary Injunction, the Court hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

- 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and there is good cause to believe that it will have jurisdiction over all parties hereto; the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendants John Doe 1 and 2 ("Defendants") under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701), the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125), the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)), and the common law of trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment and conversion.
- 2. Defendants have not responded to the Court's August 5, 2016 Order to Show Cause.
- 3. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in and are likely to engage in acts or practices that violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701), the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125), Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)) and constitute trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment and conversion, and that Microsoft is, therefore, likely to prevail on the merits of this action.
- 4. Microsoft owns the registered trademarks "Microsoft," "Internet Explorer," "Outlook," "Hotmail" and "OneDrive" used in connection with its services, software and products.
- 5. There is good cause to believe that, unless Defendants are enjoined by Order of this Court, immediate and irreparable harm will result from the Defendants' ongoing violations. The evidence set forth in Microsoft's Brief in Support of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction ("TRO Application"), and the accompanying declarations and exhibits, demonstrates that Microsoft is

likely to prevail on its claim that Defendants have engaged in violations of the foregoing law by:

- a. intentionally accessing and sending malicious software, code, and instructions
  to the protected computers, operating systems, and computer networks of
  Microsoft and the customers of Microsoft, without authorization or exceeding
  authorization, in order to
  - i. infect those computers and computer networks with malicious code and thereby gain control over those computers and computer networks;
  - ii. attack and compromise the security of those computers and computer networks by conducting remote reconnaissance, stealing authentication credentials, monitoring the activities of users, and using other instrumentalities of theft; and
  - iii. steal and exfiltrate information from those computers and computer networks
- deploying computers and Internet domains to establish a command and control infrastructure by which means Defendants conduct illegal activities, including attacks on computers and networks, monitoring of the activities of users, and the theft of information;
- c. corrupting the Microsoft's operating system and applications on victims' computers and networks, thereby using them to monitor the activities of users and steal information from them.
- 6. There is good cause to believe that if such conduct continues, irreparable harm will occur to Microsoft, Microsoft's customers, and the public. There is good cause to believe that the Defendants will continue to engage in such unlawful actions if not immediately restrained from doing so by Order of this Court.
- 7. There is good cause to believe that immediate and irreparable damage to this Court's ability to grant effective final relief will result from the sale, transfer, or other disposition or concealment by Defendants of Strontium command and control software that is

hosted at and otherwise operates through the Internet domains listed in Appendix A to this Order ("Appendix A") and from the destruction or concealment of other discoverable evidence of Defendants' misconduct available via those domains, if Defendants receive advance notice of this action. Based on the evidence cited in Microsoft's TRO Application and accompanying declarations and exhibits, Microsoft is likely to be able to prove that:

- a. Defendants are engaged in activities that directly violate United States law and harm Microsoft and the public, including Microsoft's customers;
- b. Defendants have continued their unlawful conduct despite the clear injury to the foregoing interests; and
- c. Defendants are likely to delete or to relocate the command and control software at issue in Microsoft's TRO Application and the harmful and malicious software disseminated through the Internet domains listed in Appendix A, thereby permitting them to continue his illegal acts.
- 8. Microsoft's request for this preliminary injunction is not the result of any lack of diligence on Microsoft's part, but instead based upon the nature of Defendants' unlawful conduct. Therefore, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), good cause and the interest of justice require that this Order be Granted;
- 9. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have specifically directed their activities to computers of Microsoft's customers located in the Eastern District of Virginia, have engaged in illegal activity using the Internet domains identified in Appendix A to this Order by directing malicious code and content to said computers of Microsoft's customers, to further perpetrate their illegal conduct victimizing Microsoft's customers. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have directed said malicious code and content through certain instrumentalities specifically the domains and the domain registration facilities of the domain registries identified in Appendix A.
- 10. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in illegal activity by using the domain registration facilities of the domain registries identified in Appendix A to

register the Internet domains identified in Appendix A, so as to deliver from those domains the malicious code, content, and commands that Defendants use to access Microsoft's services without authorization and to infect and compromise the computers of Microsoft's customers, and to receive the information stolen from those computers.

- 11. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in illegal activity by using deceptive and fake methods to steal computer users' login and/or account credentials and to use such credentials for illegal purposes.
- 12. There is good cause to believe that to immediately halt the injury caused by Defendants, Defendants must be prohibited from accessing Microsoft's services without authorization and prohibited from sending malicious code, content and commands from the Internet domains identified in Appendix A to the computers of Microsoft's customers.
- 13. There is good cause to believe that Defendants have engaged in illegal activity using the Internet domains identified in Appendix A to host the command and control software and content used to infect and compromise the computers and networks of Microsoft's customers and to steal information from them. There is good cause to believe that to immediately halt the injury caused by Defendants, each of Defendants' current and prospective domains set forth in Appendix A must be immediately redirected to the Microsoft-secured name-servers named NS149.microsoftinternetsafety.net and NS150.microsoftinternetsafety.net, thus making them inaccessible to Defendants for command and control purposes.
- 14. There is good cause to permit notice of the instant Order and service of all other pleadings by formal and alternative means, given the exigency of the circumstances and the need for prompt relief. The following means of service are authorized by law, satisfy Due Process, and satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) and are reasonably calculated to notify Defendants of the instant order: (1) transmission by email, facsimile, mail and/or personal delivery to the contact information provided by Defendants to Defendants' domain registrars and hosting companies and as agreed to by Defendants in Defendants' domain registration and/or hosting agreements, (2) publishing notice on a publicly available Internet website, (3) by personal

delivery upon Defendants, to the extent Defendants provided accurate contact information in the U.S.; (4) personal delivery through the Hague Convention on Service Abroad or similar treaties upon Defendants, to the extent Defendants provided accurate contact information in foreign countries that are signatory to such treaties.

#### PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, Defendants, Defendants' representatives, and persons who are in active concert or participation with Defendants, are temporarily restrained and enjoined from: (1) intentionally accessing and sending malicious software or code to Microsoft and the protected computers and operating systems of Microsoft and Microsoft's customers, without authorization, in order to infect those computers; (2) intentionally attacking and compromising computers or computer networks of Microsoft or Microsoft's customers, to monitor the activities of the owners or users of those computers or computer networks, and to steal information from those computers or networks; (3) configuring, deploying, operating, or otherwise participating in or facilitating a command and control infrastructure described in the TRO Application, including but not limited to the command and control software hosted at and operating through the Internet domains set forth in Appendix A and through any other component or element of the command and control infrastructure at any location; (4) stealing information from Microsoft's customers; (5) misappropriating that which rightfully belongs to Microsoft, its customers, or in which Microsoft or its customers have a proprietary interest; (6) downloading or offering to download additional malicious software onto the computers of Microsoft's customers; or (7) undertaking any similar activity that inflicts harm on Microsoft. Microsoft's customers, or the public.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, Defendants, Defendants' representatives, and persons who are in active concert or participation with Defendants are enjoined from (1) using and infringing Microsoft's trademarks, including specifically Microsoft's registered trademark "Microsoft," bearing registration number 2872708, "Windows," bearing registration number 2463526, "Internet Explorer," bearing registration number 0861311, "Outlook," bearing

registration number 4255129, "Hotmail," bearing registration number 2165601, "OneDrive," bearing registration number 4941897, and/or other trademarks, trade names, service marks, or Internet Domain addresses or names; (2) using in connection with Defendants' activities, products, or services any false or deceptive designation, representation or description of Defendants or of their activities, whether by symbols, words, designs or statements, which would damage or injure Microsoft or give Defendants an unfair competitive advantage or result in deception of consumers; or (3) acting in any other manner which suggests in any way that Defendants' activities, products or services come from or are somehow sponsored by or affiliated with Microsoft, or passing off Defendants' activities, products or services as Microsoft's.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to the Internet domains set forth in Appendix A, the domain registries located in the United States shall take the following actions:

- A. Maintain unchanged the WHOIS or similar contact and identifying information as of the time of receipt of this Order and maintain the domains with the current registrar;
- B. The domains shall remain active and continue to resolve in the manner set forth in this Order;
- C. Prevent transfer or modification of the domains by Defendants or third parties at the registrar;
- D. The domains shall be redirected to secure servers by changing the authoritative name servers to NS149.microsoftinternetsafety.net and NS150.microsoftinternetsafety.net and, as may be necessary, the IP address associated with name server or taking other reasonable steps to work with Microsoft to ensure the redirection of the domains and to ensure that Defendants cannot use them to make unauthorized access to computers, infect computers, compromise computers and computer networks, monitor the owners and users of computers and computer networks, or steal information from them;
- E. Take all steps required to propagate to the foregoing changes through the Domain Name System ("DNS"), including domain registrars; and
  - F. Preserve all evidence that may be used to identify the Defendants using the

domains.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that copies of this Order and all other pleadings and documents in this action may be served by any means authorized by law, including (1) transmission by email, facsimile, mail and/or personal delivery to the contact information provided by Defendants to Defendants' domain registrars and/or hosting companies and as agreed to by Defendants in the domain registration and/or hosting agreements, (2) publishing notice on a publicly available Internet website, (3) by personal delivery upon Defendants, to the extent Defendants provided accurate contact information in the U.S.; (4) personal delivery through the Hague Convention on Service Abroad or similar treaties upon Defendants, to the extent Defendants provided accurate contact information in foreign countries that are signatory to such treaties.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Entered this \( \frac{1}{2} \) day of August, 2016

Gerald Bruce Lee United States District Judge

Gerald Bruce Lee United States District Judge

### APPENDIX A

## **.ORG DOMAINS**

Registry
Public Interest Registry (PIR)
1775 Wiehle Avenue
Suite 200
Reston Virginia 20190
United States

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adobestatistic.org	tatsuo.lesch@openmailbox.org	
	Tatsuo Lesch	
	Bratislava	
	Bratislava	
	Bratislavskykraj	
	21343	
	sk	

## .COM, .NET DOMAINS

## Registry

VeriSign, Inc.
VeriSign Information Services, Inc.
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston Virginia 20190
United States

actblues.com	contact@privacyprotect.org Domain Admin Privacy Protection Service INC d/b/a PrivacyProtect.org C/O ID#10760, PO Box 16 Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator Nobby Beach Queensland QLD 4218
akamaitechupdate.com	guiromolly@mail.com guiro molly san jose cr
dvsservice.com	fernando2011@post.com fernando N/A Victoria Victoria Victoria none au

fastcontech.com	contact@privacyprotect.org Domain Admin Privacy Protection Service INC d/b/a PrivacyProtect.org C/O ID#10760, PO Box 16 Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator Nobby Beach Queensland QLD 4218 au
intelsupportcenter.com	fisterboks@email.com Herry N/A Sweden Kronoberg Kronobergelän 5216FE se
microsoftcorpstatistic.com	welch.ebony@openmailbox.org Welch Ebony Madrid Madrid Madrid 21451 es
microsoftdccenter.com	contact@privacyprotect.org Domain Admin Privacy Protection Service INC d/b/a PrivacyProtect.org C/O ID#10760, PO Box 16 Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator Nobby Beach Queensland QLD 4218 au
msmodule.com	contact@privacyprotect.org Domain Admin Privacy Protection Service INC d/b/a PrivacyProtect.org C/O ID#10760, PO Box 16 Note - Visit PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator Note - Visit

	PrivacyProtect.org to contact the domain owner/operator
	Nobby Beach
	Queensland
	QLD 4218
	au
notificationstatus.com	MEELMAN@MAIL.COM
Homitounous assessment	DANIEL MEELMAN
	HOME
!	GULLMARSVAGEN 4,JOHANNESHOV
	STOCKHOLM
	JOHANNESHOV
	121 40
	se
onedrivemicrosoft.com	fredmansur@mail.com
	Fred Mansur
	Mail inc
	2 E 55th St, NY 10022
	New York
	Connecticut
	22100 2200
	us
rsshotmail.com	nordelivery@gmail.com
	MIKA HANALUINEN
	NORD-DELIVERY
	mika.hanaluinen@mail.com
	Helsinki
	Helsinki
	5503
	fi
securemicrosoftstatistic.com	welch.ebony@openmailbox.org
Secure inicrosoristausuc.com	Welch
	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	Ebony
	Madrid
	Madrid
	Madrid
	21451
	es
1.1	1.10
adobestatistic.com	tatsuo.lesch@openmailbox.org
	Tatsuo Lesch
	Bratislava
1	Bratislava

adobeupdatetechnology.com	Bratislavskykraj 21343 sk best.cameron@mail.com
	cameron N/A melbourne melbourne Western Australia none au
akamaitechnologysupport.c	bergers3008@usa.com
om	bergers
<del></del> :	N/A
	Plano
	Plano
	Texas
	75074
	us
inteldrv64.com	chertonaksol@mail.com
	Feris
	N/A
	USA
	Buffalo
	New York
	14202
	us
intelsupportcenter.net	fisterboks@email.com
	Herry
	N/A
	Sweden
	Kronoberg
	Kronobergelän
	5216FE
	se